Free Speech at the Shopping Mall

Free Speech at the Shopping Mall


Sunday, August 18, 2013

This article was originally published by California Lawyer, a leading legal magazine, in April 2011. © The Daily Journal Corporation. All rights reserved. by Marc Price Wolf.

Free speech is a right cherished by every American. For well over two centuries, we have experienced (if not always enjoyed) robust debate in public forums. However, it’s not always easy to determine whether a particular forum is public.

A couple of generations ago, it was fair to assume that public forums were publicly owned: street corners, parks, and plazas adjacent to government buildings. Although we have long thought of free speech in the context of the proverbial town square, that concept has evolved over the years. One of its more ubiquitous iterations is the modern shopping mall.

Shopping malls generally resemble public forums in that they are places of free public access where people regularly congregate for a variety of reasons. Most, however, are privately owned. This modern duality between public access and private ownership complicates the already labyrinthine area of free speech law. Shopping malls are not only where the rubber meets the road for fashion aficionados, they are the fulcrum in the balance between the values of private property ownership and free speech.

The High Court Speaks

The U.S. Supreme Court initially applied the First Amendment to private property in 1946 when it held that the business district of a privately owned “company town” could not restrict expressive rights because the town was the functional equivalent of a municipality. The Court concluded that “the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.” (Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).) Two decades later, the Court held that a privately owned shopping mall was the “functional equivalent” of the business district described in Marsh. (See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 318 (1968).)

However, in 1976 the Court took a big step in the opposite direction, expanding property rights at the expense of free speech. In the context of a labor dispute, the justices held that the First Amendment did not guarantee the right to free speech in privately owned shopping centers because the centers were not state actors (Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 – 521 (1976)). Four years later, the Court reaffirmed the notion that individuals do not have First Amendment rights to freely express themselves in privately owned shopping malls (Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80 (1980)). However, Pruneyard is also notable for a second holding–that state constitutions may confer upon citizens broader speech rights than the federal Constitution does.

California’s Free Speech Clause

The Pruneyard case involved an appeal from the California Supreme Court, which had relied on the state constitution, primarily article I, section 2, to find that the reasonable exercise of speech and of petition rights on privately owned shopping malls are protected activities (Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979)). One important difference between the First Amendment and the free speech clause of California’s constitution is that the rights guaranteed under the latter do not depend on those guaranteed by the former. California prides itself on the fact that its constitution has always been “a document of independent force and effect particularly in the area of individual liberties.” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal. 4th 468, 489 – 490 (2000).) The free speech clause and the right to freedom of speech contained in the California Constitution “are not only as broad and as great as the First Amendment’s, they are even ‘broader’ and ‘greater.’ ” (Gerawan, 24 Cal. 4th at 491.)

In Pruneyard, a local shopping center in Campbell prohibited a group of high school students from soliciting opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism. The California Supreme Court held that the mall could not prohibit the students’ efforts even though their free speech activity was unrelated to the business of the shopping mall. The court compared the public areas of shopping malls to the streets and sidewalks of the central business districts of cities, which have “immemorially been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing public questions.” (Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).) Recognizing the growing importance of the shopping center to American life, the court held that “to prohibit expressive activity in the centers would impinge on constitutional rights beyond speech rights.” (Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 907.)

Other States

Although the constitutions of 34 states have free speech provisions virtually identical to California’s, few of them have been interpreted as being more expansive than the First Amendment. The high courts of Massachusetts and Washington, for example, have recognized a limited expressive right to solicit signatures for electoral petitions at private shopping centers, but their rulings were grounded in free elections rights, not in free speech rights alone (Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 595 (Mass. 1983); Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 116 – 117 (Wash. 1981) (plurality opinion)). In Colorado, the state supreme court ruled that a particular shopping mall was effectively a public entity because of the mall’s financial and other relationships with the city government (Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 43 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991)).

New Jersey is the only state to wholeheartedly follow California’s lead. In fact, its supreme court has even gone a few steps further and affirmed the protection of speech outside of the mall context, such as in private universities and hallways in residential buildings. (See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 631 – 633 (N.J. 1980); Guttenberg Taxpayers & Rentpayers Ass’n v. Galaxy Towers Condominium Ass’n, 688 A.2d 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996), aff’d, 688 A.2d 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).)

That so few states have taken California’s approach should not be too surprising. Unlike most public forums, private shopping centers are not owned by the government, paid for by taxpayers, or maintained by government employees. The private owner of a shopping center is responsible for paying property taxes, hiring employees, safeguarding the premises, maintaining the structure, and keeping the common areas clean. Shopping malls generally do not incorporate housing, town halls, libraries, places of worship, hospitals, or schools. There is no “mayor of the mall,” and shoppers do not expect to have a say in the everyday affairs of a commercial shopping center. Despite these differences, the California Supreme Court upheld free speech rights at shopping malls in Pruneyard, and reaffirmed its holding nearly 30 years later. (See Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850 (2007).)

Pruneyard Revisited

The Fashion Valley Mall in San Diego had a rule that prohibited anyone from “interfering” with the business of a mall merchant by “encouraging” customers not to patronize that business. When a group of union members attempted to pass out flyers urging a boycott of a mall department store, the mall’s management disbanded the group by claiming trespass, threatening civil litigation and possible arrest. But the California Supreme Court held that requiring shopping malls to allow free speech activity did not “unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center.” (Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 863.) The court balanced private property rights against free speech needs, and the latter, by a slim 4 – 3 majority, prevailed.

The court explained that the application of free speech rights is not solely determined by the distinction between public and private ownership of property. The focus of the court’s analysis was on the use of the property in question. And although it concluded that the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in shopping malls–including the right to advocate a boycott–the court emphasized a shopping center’s right to impose reasonable regulations upon expressive activity.

What’s Reasonable?

In California, litigation involving speech at shopping malls has centered on the boundaries of such regulations. The level of scrutiny a court will apply to a given regulation varies with the context.

If the rule is truly content neutral and governs the “time, place or manner” of the speech activity, the court will utilize an intermediate level of scrutiny to determine whether the rule (1) is narrowly tailored; (2) serves a significant government interest; and (3) leaves open ample alternative avenues of communication (Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 865).

On the other hand, if the rule regulates the speech on the basis of content, it will be subject to strict scrutiny–which means that the restriction must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end (42 Cal. 4th at 869).

Although the rule in the Fashion Valley Mall case applied to all requests for a consumer boycott, the court did not view it as content neutral. The court noted that such a regulation might be viewpoint neutral because it treats all boycotts the same way; but it is not content neutral because it prohibits speech that urges a boycott while it permits speech that does not. Case law has demonstrated time and again that few content-based regulations on speech–including a shopping mall’s rule prohibiting boycott advocacy–can withstand strict scrutiny.

In one case, a suit arose after a security guard at Westfield Mall near Sacramento observed Matthew Snatchko, a youth pastor, chatting about his religion with three women whom he did not know. The women appeared to welcome the conversation. After Snatchko refused the security guard’s request that he leave the mall, the guard handcuffed him and local police arrested him for disturbing the peace. Although the charges were dropped, Snatchko sued the security guard and the mall, contending the restrictions violated his First Amendment rights.

At issue was the constitutionality of the mall’s rules requiring persons to obtain a permit before engaging in any “non-commercial expressive activity.” Westfield said the phrase referred to any activity that had a “political, religious or other non-commercial purpose.” (Snatchko v. Westfield, LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 469, 478 (2010).)

As such, Westfield’s regulation went a giant step further than the one struck down in Fashion Valley Mall. Instead of prohibiting only speech promoting boycotts, it banned even peaceful, consensual, spontaneous conversations between strangers. The net result was that mall patrons were technically prohibited from talking to a stranger about the weather, a current event, or even the latest TV episode of Top Chef. While the rule might turn the mall into a safe zone from bad pick-up lines, it also places a restriction on the content of speech. When the court subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny, it failed to pass constitutional muster.

Even if the court had considered the restriction to be content neutral, the rule burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to advance any of its purported legitimate safety and convenience interests. A rule prohibiting strangers from engaging in impromptu chitchat is akin to a rule one would expect to find in a totalitarian police state, not a suburban shopping mall in Roseville.

The court aptly noted that providing a “stress-free shopping atmosphere” for patrons–the purported intent of Westfield Mall’s rules–was not a compelling interest compared with the free speech rights of other individuals in the mall: A shopping mall cannot justify the prohibition of peaceful, noncommercial speech “because it might result in lost profits if shoppers become annoyed or offended and leave.” (Snatchko, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 489.)

And just last month, the court of appeal decided a case in which a shopping mall imposed rules granting preferential treatment to labor-related speech–a fact that no doubt would have delighted the labor protestors in the Fashion Valley Mall case. However, the court held that it was improper for the mall to prefer one type of speech over another based on content. It noted that “a shopping mall must allow protests within aural and visual range of a targeted business whenever the mall is open to the public.” A mall cannot impose a “blanket ban on the time or place of free speech” unless it is the only way “to prevent substantial disruption of normal business operations.” (See Best Friends Animal Soc. v. Macerich Westside Pavilion Property LLC (2011 WL 711584).)

Big-Box Stores
Although California courts have extended free speech protections to shopping malls, they have not done the same for speech in stand-alone stores. While difficult to define, a stand-alone store generally is a place of business not physically attached to another place of business. (See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106, 109 (2003) (individual grocery store).)

For free speech protections to apply on private property, the owner must open the premises for public use so as to “make it the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum.” (Albertson’s, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 118 (citing Trader Joe’s Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 433 – 444 (1999)).) Courts consider a variety of factors, including the extent of the invitation by the property owner to the public; the nature of the primary use of the property; any relationship between the speech activities and the primary use of the property; the size of the business; and the public’s interest in using the property as a venue for free speech (Albertson’s, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 119).

Big-box stores have become more relevant in the free speech debate as they continue to proliferate. Many big-box outlets now replicate the diverse shopping options of a mall, but in one enormous store. For instance, in addition to selling clothing, electronics, home and garden supplies, furniture, and jewelry, many of these stores have large grocery departments, food courts, and open spaces for congregation. Indeed, big-box stores and shopping malls are becoming indistinguishable in terms of the five public-forum factors cited in the Albertson’s case.

More than 30 years ago, California took the lead in protecting speech at shopping malls. Only time will tell if the Golden State becomes the first to extend free speech protections to big-box stores.

Marc Price Wolf is an associate in the litigation department at Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin in San Francisco.

What does United States law say about sharing your faith in public?

What does United States law say about sharing your faith in public?

Sunday, August 18, 2013

aclj

Below is a short legal analysis prepared by ACLJ (American Center for Law and Justice)
attorneys on this topic. A more in-depth legal analysis is available here.

The streets and sidewalks of the United States are an open forum for evangelism. The Constitution guarantees the right to preach the Gospel in public places. The Supreme Court’s many cases involving preaching (or other speech activities) on the streets provide ready answers to those who challenge your right to give away religious tracks, pamphlets, and other printed materials and to speak with people on the street about your faith.

What laws protect my right to witness and share my faith in public?

When you give away religious tracts in public places – streets, sidewalks, and parks – you are engaged in a form of speech and publication protected by the United States Constitution and civil rights laws. When you speak with someone about the Gospel while in a public place, you enjoy constitutional protection.

As American citizens, we are protected by the United States Constitution from government interference with our right of free speech. This includes the right to evangelize. Also, the Constitutions of every state in our country include guarantees of free speech, which are at least as protective of free speech as the federal Constitution.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” and the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” The Supreme Court has ruled that these two provisions of the Constitution severely limit the power of federal, state, and local governments to interfere with speech activities on sidewalks, streets and in parks. Moreover, Supreme Court “precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.” Capitol Square & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).

It is a constitutional axiom that the distribution of free religious literature is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). As the Supreme Court unequivocally held in Murdock v. Pennsylvania:

The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age old form of missionary evangelism — as old as the history of printing presses. It has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years. . . . It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits.

319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943) (footnotes omitted).

Am I soliciting when I hand out religious literature and share my faith?

No! Giving away free Gospel tracts and talking to people about salvation are not the same thing as soliciting. The Supreme Court has held that there is a difference between soliciting and leafleting. In United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), the Supreme Court permitted the postal service to enforce a rule against asking (soliciting) for donations on postal property. However, the Court suggested that it would reject a rule that banned free distribution of literature on such properties, stating:

As residents of metropolitan areas know from daily experience, confrontation by a person asking for money disrupts passage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter with a person giving out information. One need not ponder the contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in order mechanically to take it out of someone’s hand, but one must listen, comprehend, decide and act in order to respond to a solicitation.

Id. at 734 (plurality).

In ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), and Lee v. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 830 (1992), the Supreme Court considered a restriction on leafleting and another restriction on solicitation of donations in airport terminals. The Court concluded that solicitation is separate from literature distribution and that, despite the fact that the airport terminals were nonpublic forums, a regulation barring the distribution of free literature in the terminals was unreasonable and unconstitutional. Accordingly, while a city official may, in some instances, not allow solicitation, such a regulation may not be broadened to include literature distribution. As long as you are giving away your literature for free, and not asking for donations, you are engaging in the most protected form of speech.

Where can I go to hand out Gospel tracts to the public?

You can go to any publicly owned street, sidewalk, or park. In legal terms, streets, sidewalks, and parks are called “traditional public forums.” The Supreme Court has held that a traditional public forum is government property that is traditionally opened to public speech, Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939), including such places as streets, sidewalks, and parks, see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). That means that these are the places that are open to public speeches, leafleting, newspaper distribution, political rallies, public marches, and other speech activity.

You are not merely limited to streets, parks, and sidewalks for tract distribution; courts have found many other places to be appropriate. Subject to local laws and ordinances, airport terminals, bus and train stations, and walkways surrounding government-owned coliseums, stadiums, and memorials may be appropriate locations for leafleting. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (resolution banning all first amendment expression in the public forum of an airport was unquestionably overbroad); Grace, 461 U.S. at 180 (holding that the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court constitute a public forum); Jews for Jesus v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993) (overturning a complete ban on noncommercial expressive activity in a train station).

Sometimes a city official will get confused about these “traditional public forums.” For example, in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), the Supreme Court rejected a Wisconsin city’s argument that the streets and sidewalks of a residential area were not the sort of “traditional public forums” that the Court had held were generally open to free speech and activities.

The Court noted in Frisby, however, that some time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible depending on the nature of the streets at issue. Id. at 481. For example, a rule against parades between sunset and sunrise on residential streets serves a valid purpose of protecting the peace of a neighborhood when most residents are resting. It is wise to look up local laws and ordinances ahead of time. You can always call the local police station if you have questions.

If I am witnessing on the public sidewalk in front of a business, am I “loitering,” and can I be required to move away from the business?

No! “Loitering” is the criminal offense of remaining in a certain place (such as a public street) for no apparent reason. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed. 2009). Evangelism activities, however, are a legitimate purpose for standing on a public sidewalk. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (noting the difference between remaining in one place with no apparent purpose and conduct intended to convey a message).

Do not stand in the middle of the street where you will be obstructing the flow of traffic. The government may prohibit this in the interest of vehicle and pedestrian safety. See, e.g., Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Hollywood, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Your right to use the sidewalks, streets and parks is not a license to make them unusable for others, e.g., barricading a sidewalk, allowing only those who will take a tract to pass. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).

Do I have the same rights to witness on the streets of a town in which I don’t live?

The constitutional protection of free speech under the First Amendment applies to all citizens and aliens and extends throughout the United States. Thus you are not limited to sharing your faith on the streets, sidewalks, and parks in your town. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). Many cases which the ACLJ has won involve visitors from other towns or other states.

What should I do to get started witnessing and sharing my faith in public?

First, devote time to prayerful preparation. Next, select a location. You may choose a place because of the opportunity to reach many people – outside a sports stadium or near an historic monument. You may also have a target group in mind. For example, if your burden is for young people, you will want to pick locations where they pass by or gather.

If the location you choose is not a nice, simple sidewalk location, you should speak to the appropriate authority to discover what rules have been adopted to govern your activities. (This does not mean that you must always accept, as good law, a rule barring leafleting.) Check with a county clerk, the police department, the security office at the stadium, or similar offices. This will let you know what to expect when you witness.

If you are in a public place and are stopped from distributing free literature, do not assume that it was correct for you to be stopped. Too many Supreme Court cases have been decided against governments on these matters to assume that the government is always right. Just by challenging them, the government often changes their policies.

Actually, Prohibition Was a Success

Actually, Prohibition Was a Success


Monday, July 01, 2013

The following article is an opinion piece by Mark H. Moore, a criminal justice professor at Harvard, that was published in the New York Times on October 16, 1989. It can be viewed at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/16/ opinion/actually-prohibition-was-a-success.html.

Although Moore only specifically addresses drug use, his article is a part of our series on homosexuality because it touches on an issue relevant to both topics. People frequently cite America’s prohibition years as proof that we cannot legislate morality, and that any attempts to do so will only create worse problems. They apply this logic to homosexuality, arguing that the law cannot be used to discourage homosexual behavior, even if it comes with severe health risks and offers no benefit to society (which, as you can see from many of the other articles we’ve posted, is the case). But did prohibition truly fail? Is using the law to discourage behavior really as futile as we’ve been led to believe?

History has valuable lessons to teach policy makers but it reveals its lessons only grudgingly.

Close analyses of the facts and their relevance is required lest policy makers fall victim to the persuasive power of false analogies and are misled into imprudent judgments. Just such a danger is posed by those who casually invoke the ”lessons of Prohibition” to argue for the legalization of drugs.

What everyone ”knows” about Prohibition is that it was a failure. It did not eliminate drinking; it did create a black market. That in turn spawned criminal syndicates and random violence. Corruption and widespread disrespect for law were incubated and, most tellingly, Prohibition was repealed only 14 years after it was enshrined in the Constitution.

The lesson drawn by commentators is that it is fruitless to allow moralists to use criminal law to control intoxicating substances. Many now say it is equally unwise to rely on the law to solve the nation’s drug problem.

But the conventional view of Prohibition is not supported by the facts.

First, the regime created in 1919 by the 18th Amendment and the Volstead Act, which charged the Treasury Department with enforcement of the new restrictions, was far from all-embracing. The amendment prohibited the commercial manufacture and distribution of alcoholic beverages; it did not prohibit use, nor production for one’s own consumption. Moreover, the provisions did not take effect until a year after passage -plenty of time for people to stockpile supplies.

Second, alcohol consumption declined dramatically during Prohibition. Cirrhosis death rates for men were 29.5 per 100,000 in 1911 and 10.7 in 1929. Admissions to state mental hospitals for alcoholic psychosis declined from 10.1 per 100,000 in 1919 to 4.7 in 1928.

Arrests for public drunkennness and disorderly conduct declined 50 percent between 1916 and 1922. For the population as a whole, the best estimates are that consumption of alcohol declined by 30 percent to 50 percent.

Third, violent crime did not increase dramatically during Prohibition. Homicide rates rose dramatically from 1900 to 1910 but remained roughly constant during Prohibition’s 14 year rule. Organized crime may have become more visible and lurid during Prohibition, but it existed before and after.

Fourth, following the repeal of Prohibition, alcohol consumption increased. Today, alcohol is estimated to be the cause of more than 23,000 motor vehicle deaths and is implicated in more than half of the nation’s 20,000 homicides. In contrast, drugs have not yet been persuasively linked to highway fatalities and are believed to account for 10 percent to 20 percent of homicides.

Prohibition did not end alcohol use. What is remarkable, however, is that a relatively narrow political movement, relying on a relatively weak set of statutes, succeeded in reducing, by one-third, the consumption of a drug that had wide historical and popular sanction.

This is not to say that society was wrong to repeal Prohibition. A democratic society may decide that recreational drinking is worth the price in traffic fatalities and other consequences. But the common claim that laws backed by morally motivated political movements cannot reduce drug use is wrong.

Not only are the facts of Prohibition misunderstood, but the lessons are misapplied to the current situation.

The U.S. is in the early to middle stages of a potentially widespread cocaine epidemic. If the line is held now, we can prevent new users and increasing casualties. So this is exactly not the time to be considering a liberalization of our laws on cocaine. We need a firm stand by society against cocaine use to extend and reinforce the messages that are being learned through painful personal experience and testimony.

The real lesson of Prohibition is that the society can, indeed, make a dent in the consumption of drugs through laws. There is a price to be paid for such restrictions, of course. But for drugs such as heroin and cocaine, which are dangerous but currently largely unpopular, that price is small relative to the benefits.